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Abstract 
This study examines the impact of cash holdings on firm value before and during the 
2008 financial crisis, conditional on financial constraints and corporate governance. 
We show that the equity market places a higher value on corporate cash holdings 
during the financial crisis and cash holdings are more valuable to constrained firms, 
compared to unconstrained firms. However, the triple-interaction of cash with 
constraints and crisis shows the crisis value effect for constrained firms is weaker than 
for unconstrained firms. Further, the triple-interaction of excess cash with governance 
and constraints shows that a positive governance effect on corporate cash holdings is 
more pronounced for firms that are financially constrained. 
 
Keywords: cash holdings; firm value; financial crisis; financial constraints; corporate 
governance.  
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1. Introduction 
Is there a value impact of cash holdings? In a perfect market, with zero 
transaction costs and no impediments to financing, the level of cash holdings is 
irrelevant. An imperfect market will allow firms with cash to avoid transaction costs
1
 
and underinvestment (Keynes, 1936). Conversely, in an agency theoretic framework, 
holding excess cash will result in a reduction in firm value. Large amounts of cash 
enable managers to pursue their own interests and invest in potentially negative NPV 
projects. Hence, in theory there may be a point at which the level of cash held 
achieves an exact offset between the marginal benefits and costs of doing so. 
Consequently variation in the level of cash holdings is expected to impact the value of 
the firm. The key purpose of our study is to assess the impact of cash holdings on firm 
value. The value impact is analysed in the context of three intervening effects: 
financial constraints, financial crisis and corporate governance.  
Studies that assess the value of cash holdings show that firm‘s ability to find 
external financing will impact the results (Faulkender & Wang, 2006). A financially 
constrained firm is typically smaller, younger and faces greater frictions when 
accessing external financing (Almeida et al. (2004); Chan et al. (2010)). Cash is 
therefore of more value to them (Denis & Sibilkov, 2010).  
The Global Financial Crisis started in December 2007 and took a sharp 
downward turn in September 2008, which was characterized as a shock to the supply 
of credit to all firms (Gorton (2010)). However, some firms were affected more than 
others. We rely on this unexpected credit shock to investigate the constraint effect on 
the value of cash holdings. Duchin et al. (2010) show that the financial crisis induced 
financially constrained firms to rely more on their cash holdings to finance 
investments. Moreover, based on value-weighted risk-adjusted return for cash-rich 
and cash-poor firms around June 2007, they demonstrate that firms with more cash 
                                                          
1
 The relevance of transaction costs is demonstrated in Kim et al. (1998). 
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holdings outperform. This evidence suggests that cash holdings had a value-
enhancing impact on firm performance during the crisis. However, our study is unique 
in that it examines the crisis effect on firm value given differential financial constraint 
status.  
Corporate governance has a potentially material impact on the value that 
shareholders place on cash holdings (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007). Poorly-governed 
firms are more likely to waste cash, whereas firms with good corporate governance 
ensure a more effective use of their cash savings. During the crisis, when outside 
equity and debt financing are typically more expensive and difficult to obtain, a better 
use of cash holdings is expected to increase firm value. Our analyses examines the 
governance effect on cash holdings during the crisis. We also explore the interactive 
relation between corporate governance and financial constraints, and in particular 
their joint effect on cash holdings. In theory, financially-constrained firms rely more 
on cash holdings to finance their positive NPV projects; and stronger corporate 
governance ensures firm efficiency over cash deployment. Accordingly, we expect the 
governance effect on cash holdings is more pronounced for financially-constrained 
firms.  
Our work complements and neatly converges the prior literatures on cash 
holdings, financial constraints and governance. We investigate the interactive relation 
between governance, financial constraints and the crisis. We use data covering the 
period 2002 to 2010, with 2008-2010 being deemed the crisis period, as Kahle & 
Stulz (2013) state that this time window is well-suited to examine the impact of 
liquidity shocks. The financial crisis had substantial effects on the U.S. economy, 
which included an unprecedented number of regional bank failures, the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers and a large number of runs on financial institutions. Collectively, it 
all represents a shock to the supply of credit to corporations, which provides us with a 
unique setting to examine the change of value of cash holdings since cash provides 
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firms with liquidity support at any time. Moreover, we argue that not only did the 
financial sectors get affected by the crisis, but the non-financial sectors also suffered 
from induced liquidity constraints (Brunnermeier, 2009).  
Following Faulkender & Wang (2006) we examine the unexpected change in 
cash holdings, modelling annual firm excess return as a function of the change in 
―excess‖ cash holdings. The model is assessed for constrained and unconstrained 
firms and for the quality of corporate governance. We predict that the impact of cash 
holdings on firm value will be stronger in times of financial crisis, irrespective of 
whether firms are financially constrained or not. However, given that constrained 
firms are sensitive to macroeconomic shocks (e.g., Fazzari et al. (1988)), we expect 
the impact to be more pronounced for constrained firms. Firms with good corporate 
governance are expected to display a stronger relation between cash holdings and firm 
value and this relation will be more pronounced if a firm is financially constrained.  
In light of Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2015), unique to our study is a 
―voting method‖ for determining if a firm is financial constrained. We combine a 
number of relevant sorting variables to construct a new ―amalgam‖ variable based on 
the distribution of outcomes of all the standard classification methods, including 
annual payout ratio, firm size, bond rating, paper rating, life cycle and collateral 
assets. We consider the relevance of the quality of corporate governance using the E-
Index, Executive Compensation and Institutional Ownership as our proxies. Our 
analysis is extended to account for endogeneity. We also employ a propensity score 
matching approach, following Campello et al. (2010) and Kahle & Stulz (2013) to 
match constrained and unconstrained firms, then assess the value of cash holdings 
across time and for different governance levels.  
Our results provide new evidence on the value of cash holdings. In our core 
finding we show that the equity market places a higher value on corporate cash 
holdings during the financial crisis. Also, there is some evidence to show cash 
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holdings is more valuable to constrained firms, compared to unconstrained firms in a 
non-crisis period. The triple-interaction of cash with constraint and crisis effects show 
a strong negative effect. That is, the crisis value effect for constrained firms is less 
than that of unconstrained firms. Economically, we show that, in times of financial 
crisis, an extra dollar of cash is worth about $1 more to a financially unconstrained 
firm than it does to a counterpart constrained firm.  Consistent with our main findings 
on the crisis value effect, the difference-in-difference matching estimator shows that 
the constraint effect on the level of cash holdings does not become more significant in 
times of financial crisis.  
Further, while the governance effect on corporate cash holdings is unclear in 
the pre-crisis period, it becomes more pronounced and more positive during the 
financial crisis. Finally, the triple-interaction of excess cash with governance and 
constraint effects generally show a positive effect, suggesting that the positive 
governance effect on corporate cash holdings becomes more pronounced for firms 
that are financially constrained. 
The remainder of our study comprises a brief review of the literature (Section 
2); a presentation of the empirical design, including sampling and data (Section 3); 
followed by a discussion of the results (Section 4). A concluding section summarizes 
the paper and considers directions for future research. 
 
2. Related Literature 
The literature provides four motivations for firms to hold cash. First is the transaction 
cost motive where cash holdings allow the firm to avoid transaction costs when 
accessing external markets (Kim et al., 1998). Second is the precautionary motive 
suggesting that firms can meet unexpected contingencies. Third the agency motive 
implies entrenched managers retain cash (Jensen, 1986) and finally there is a tax 
motive (Foley et al., 2007). Investors place a higher value on cash holdings in firms 
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with greater growth opportunities (Pinkowitz & Williamson, 2007). Holding cash 
allows firms, with more internal liquidity, to reduce their financial distress costs 
(John, 1993 and Opler & Titman, 1994) and support competitive strategies against 
industry rivals (Fresard, 2010). The costs of cash holdings include a liquidity 
premium, Opler et al. (1999); tax disadvantages (Faulkender and Wang, 2006) and 
agency costs (Jensen, 1986). 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) show that the marginal value of cash decreases 
when the firm‘s cash level increases.2  Similarly, shareholders place a lower value on 
each additional dollar of cash when a firm‘s leverage increases since the value 
generated by cash may accrue to debtholders rather than shareholders. Moreover, 
Bates et al. (2011) shows that the value of cash holdings generally increases from the 
1980s to 2000s.
3
 Harford (1999) demonstrates that firms with higher levels of cash are 
more likely to engage in acquisitions harmful to shareholder wealth. Lee & Powell 
(2011) show that cash rich firms will underperform if they persistently hold excess 
cash for more than three years.  Fresard (2012) shows that cash holdings are sensitive 
to stock price movements, while Kisser (2013) points out that cash flow volatility 
decreases the value of cash. Liu & Mauer (2011) show that CEO risk taking (vega) 
has a negative impact on the value of cash savings to shareholder, since excess cash 
savings benefit debt holders rather than shareholders due to risk-taking incentives 
induced by high vega compensation. In short the relative benefits and costs of holding 
excess cash are unclear. 
Similarly the evidence is mixed as to the value of cash holding for firms with 
different levels of financial constraints. Denis and Sibilkov (2010) define various 
measures of a firm‘s level of financial constraints. These measures capture the firm‘s 
                                                          
2
 Chan et al. (2013) show similar findings by studying Australian companies. 
3
 Note that Bates et al. (2011) investigates the drivers for the value of cash holdings over time (i.e. IPO 
and credit market risk).  However, our paper focuses on the credit supply shock induced by financial 
crisis and studies its corresponding effect on the value of cash holdings. 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
6 
 
sufficiency of funding, access to external markets and financial condition. Financially 
constrained firms are expected to have greater reliance on cash, and cash is worth 
more to them because it provides these firms with unconditional liquidity at any time 
with no transaction costs.  Moreover, Almeida et al. (2004) find that constrained firms 
have positive cash flow sensitivity to cash, but unconstrained firms do not. Faulkender 
& Wang (2006) provide direct evidence that the equity markets place a higher value 
on cash held by constrained firms. However, Pinkowitz & Williamson (2007) find 
that the marginal value of cash is unaffected by firms access to the capital market 
which is inconsistent with Faulkender & Wang (2006). The inconsistency may arise 
because different models are used.  However, more importantly, the difference may 
arise from different methods used to classify financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms. 
To define financially constrained firms, much of the prior literature focuses on 
the firm‘s ability to access external financial markets including status according to 
size, bond ratings (both long term and short term), life cycle and collateral assets (see 
for example Almeida et al., 2004 and Denis & Sibilkov, 2010). Classification methods 
based on indices have been developed by Whited & Wu (2006) and Hadlock & Pierce 
(2010).
4
  Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2015) provide a critique of all these measures. 
The level and value of cash holdings is influence by corporate governance. 
Harford et al. (2008) show that firms with good corporate governance typically hold 
more cash than firms that are poorly governed, and Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007) 
demonstrate that the equity market places higher value on cash holdings if a firm is 
well governed. Moreover, Harford et al. (2008) show that poorly-governed firms 
dissipate cash through acquisitions which are not always value-increasing. While 
prior studies shed some light on the governance effect on cash holdings, no study has 
                                                          
4
 Kaplan & Zingales (1997) also develop an index; however, their method is criticised and shown to be 
problematic by Wited and Wu (2006) and Hadlock & Pierce (2010). 
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attempted to measure the different governance effects on cash savings under different 
economic conditions. Further, the evidence of an interactive relation between 
financial constraints and corporate governance is unknown. Financially constrained 
firms rely more on cash holdings to finance their investment opportunities, relative to 
unconstrained firms. Hence, financially constrained firms should benefit more from 
good corporate governance as cash deployment in well-governed firms will be more 
efficient. 
The recent financial crisis substantially affected financial conditions and 
funding availability of all firms. We identify the crisis as beginning in late 2007 and 
taking a sharp downward turn in September 2008.
5
 Banks substantially restricted their 
lending policies. In the fourth quarter of 2008, the dollar volume of lending was 47% 
lower than it was in the prior quarter and the associated number of loans issued was 
33% lower (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010).  McLean (2011) shows that US firms 
issue less debt in bad times, and Dittmar and Dittmar (2008) show that share issuance 
activity increases during economic expansions and falls in recessions. That is, because 
investor‘ pessimism increases during a recession, which leads to an increased 
unwillingness for the equity market to invest. In light of the above, Gorton (2010) 
argues that the recent financial crisis led to a shock to the supply of credit generally.
6
   
While it is true that the financial crisis started in the financial sector due to the 
meltdown of subprime mortgages, non-financial firms were also seriously affected. 
Brunnermeier (2009) shows that losses from ‗toxic‘ assets led banks to reduce the 
supply of liquidity to non-financial firms. Also, Ivashina & Scharfstein (2010) find 
                                                          
5
 It is recognized that the timing of the start of the financial crisis is open to interpretation – it varies 
across commentators. In this study, the window 2008 – 2010 is used as the ‗financial crisis period‘. 
This time frame is chosen because of the significant rise in the cost of corporate and bank borrowing 
starting from October 2008, following the failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 (Ivashina 
and Scharfstein, (2010)). Moreover, Kahle & Stulz (2013) point out that the recession did not start until 
December 2007. Additionally, because we use annual data, it is impractical to include the second half 
of 2007 in the financial crisis period, unless all of 2007 is included. 
6
  Kahle & Stulz (2013) refer to his argument more broadly as the ―credit supply shock theory‖. 
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that US banks sharply reduced their lending to the corporate sector during the crisis. 
Further, Brunnermeier (2009) argues that corporate risk management and financing 
policies play a central role in the degree to which firms were affected by the financial 
crisis. A strong corporate governance will improve such risk management and 
financing policies (Erkens et al. (2012)), which implies that the impact of corporate 
governance would become more pronounced during the crisis.  
Moreover, constrained firms are more likely to be affected by the crisis. 
Fazzari et al. (1988) suggest immature firms are more often denied loans than better-
quality firms during periods of tight credit. Campello et al. (2010), using survey 
evidence, document that financially constrained firms, on average, reduced 
employment by 11%, capital investment by 9%, marketing expenditures by 33%, and 
dividend payments by 14% during the financial crisis.
7
 Duchin et al. (2010) further 
show that financial constrained firms cut about two times more investments than 
unconstrained firms do during the crisis. As Lins et al. (2010) suggest, internal 
liquidity would more likely act as a buffer against economic downturn. Hence, we 
conjecture that financially constrained firms will benefit more from their cash 
holdings. 
On the other hand, a counter-argument might also exist regarding the relation 
between financial constraints and crisis. Recall that financial crisis induced banks to 
substantially restrict their lending policies and generally markets decreased their 
willingness to lend. According to the credit supply shock theory, firms that rely on 
credit will be affected more during the crisis, and firms that do not depend on credit 
                                                          
7
 We acknowledge that managers might also alter firm‘s payout policies during the crisis, but the 
predicted behavior is unclear – reflecting tension on the demand versus supply sides. On the one hand, 
managers might choose to cut dividend payouts to save cash in order to cope with the tightening 
economic conditions (Campello et al. (2010)). Alternatively, shareholders become more demanding for 
liquidities during the crisis and managers could decide to increase firm‘s cash payouts to meet such 
demand. However, a comprehensive analysis of dividend payout policies with cash holdings goes 
beyond the scope of this paper where the focus is on financial constraints. We take the view that while 
simplifying our approach to ignore these issues may reduce the power of our tests, because of the 
countervailing nature of the possible effects, an ex-ante directional bias is not so obvious.  
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before the crisis should be impacted less (Kahle & Stulz (2013)). It is essentially the 
financially unconstrained firms who depend heavily on external financing prior to the 
crisis, rather than constrained firms. From this point of view, financially constrained 
firms would be less affected by the crisis (Campello et al., 2012). Moreover, given the 
tightening financial conditions, firms might use their cash savings to pay off their debt 
to reduce the risk of default. For instance, Kahle & Stulz (2013) show that highly 
levered firms reduce their net debt issuance by 171% during the crisis. Built on these 
facts, financially unconstrained firms might benefit more from their cash holdings, 
since, in theory, constrained firms will have little debt on their balance sheets. 
We focus on the impact of cash holdings before and during the crisis. We 
expect that the firm‘s financing policy will materially change during the time of 
financial crisis. The importance of cash holdings, particularly in a crisis period, will 
vary between financially constrained and unconstrained firms. We also expect that the 
relation between (crisis) value and cash holdings will be tempered by the level of 
corporate governance.  
 
3. Empirical Design 
3.1 Proxying Financial Constraints  
Appendix A provides a summary of the methods used, in the literature, to classify 
firms as financially constrained or unconstrained. In this study we use 3 alternative 
classification methods: the Whited & We (WW) and Hadlock & Pierce (HP) index 
methods, plus we create a new joint identification method based on 6 non-index 
models.
8
  
Critics identify a variety of problems associated with the non-index 
classification methods. For example, Hadlock & Pierce (2010) show that dividend 
payouts are unlikely to be a good predictor of financial constraints, and Bond and 
                                                          
8
 We follow Chen et al. (2012) in creating our measure of the HP Index. 
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Paper ratings are more likely to capture firm size and age rather than constraint status. 
Therefore, it might not be appropriate to use any one of these sorting variables as a 
financial constraint identifier. Most recently, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2015) 
provide a much broader critique of all existing alternative proxies for financial 
constraints, showing that to varying degrees the supposedly constrained firms are not 
constrained in their ability to issue debt or equity. Moreover, they point out that 
increasing dividend payout or obtaining a credit rating does not reliably reflect a 
firm‘s financial constraint status. 
Since no current study has successfully attempted to address these issues, our 
strategy is to develop a voting method to incorporate the identification effects of all 
the popular sorting variables and construct a new amalgam proxy based on the 
distribution of outcomes of all the non-index classification methods. Our argument is 
that while each individual method in isolation is likely to have weak power to identify 
a firm‘s constraint status, the combined thrust of all these methods will bring more 
power to identify a firm‘s constraint status. Generally, our voting method is motivated 
by the development of the Majority Voting Classifier in the language of Machine 
Learning. It shows the intuitively appealing result that combining the output of some 
weak classifiers will produce better classification results than any individual classifier 
(Ruta and Gabrys (2005); Hastie et al. (2009)). 
To develop the joint identification method we begin by temporarily classifying 
each firm-year observation as ―constrained‖ or ―unconstrained‖ based independently 
on each of the six non-index methods listed in Appendix A. Then, we count the 
number of classification methods that assign a particular observation as financially 
constrained, and we allocate one ―vote‖ for each such case (zero otherwise). Given 
the fact that we have six sorting variables, the maximum score that an observation can 
receive is six. A value of ‗2‘ means there are two individual constraint methods that 
define an observation as being financially constrained.  
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Then, for each given year, we construct the sample frequency distribution. For 
Score ‗2‘, a value of ‗312‘ in 2002 means that there are 312 firm-year observations 
identified as financially constraint by two individual methods. The full sample 
distribution is presented in Table 1. Based on intuition and reasonableness, we choose 
to use ‗4‘ as a cut-off to split the sample. Specifically, if there are four or more 
individual methods that identify an observation as being constrained, then the 
observation is given ―financial constraint‖ status according to this voting method. As 
shown in Table 1, across our full pooled sample there are 2,555 firm-year 
observations that are defined as constrained versus 8,462 observations deemed 
unconstrained. The rationale for our approach is simple and intuitive – the more 
classification methods that identify the observation as being constrained, the more 
likely that observation is actually financially constrained. Finally, we define a binary 
dummy coded as one for constrained and as zero for unconstrained. 
3.2 Corporate Governance Specifications 
Consistent with Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Harford et al. (2008), we 
employ three alternative proxies for corporate governance: Institutional Ownership, 
E-Index and Executive Compensation. While there are other variables that have been 
identified as potential proxies for corporate governance, most of them have problems. 
For instance, Bebchuk et al. (2009) show that 18 of 24 provisions included in the G-
Index are redundant. There is a long debate regarding the real effect of Board Size, to 
the extent that while some argue that a larger board is value-enhancing, others believe 
the opposite.
9,10
 We also deny Insider ownership as a proxy for corporate governance 
due to its endogenous relation with firm value which is our dependent variable.
11
   
                                                          
9
 Detailed discussion of Board Size as a corporate governance proxy can be found in Kusnadi (2011) 
and Harford et al. (2008).  
10
 However, our results remain qualitatively similar if Board Size or the Number of Independent 
Directors are used as proxies for corporate governance. 
11
 The endogenous relationship between firm value and insider ownership has long been a problem in 
the area. Details can be found in Himmelberg et al. (1999); Coles et al. (2012). 
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The E-Index is related to the anti-takeover provisions that isolate managers 
from the discipline of the market for corporate control. Bebchuk et al. (2009) 
construct an entrenchment index (E-Index) by using six of the twenty-four anti-
takeover provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, 
poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and 
charter amendments. A detailed description can be found in Bebchuk et al. (2009). A 
higher E-Index is an indication of poor corporate governance, since it provides 
management with more power and shareholders with weak rights.  
Under the optimal contracting theory, executive pay is viewed as the product 
of arm‘s length contracting between directors and executives, which leads to contracts 
that provide efficient incentives for reducing agency problems (Bebchuk and 
Weisbach, 2010). Equity compensation aligns management‘ interests with 
shareholder‘ benefit and motivates managers to increase share price (Core et al., 
2003). Therefore, under this view, compensation to executives minimizes 
opportunism and is, thus, value-increasing so that high compensation implies good 
governance. Following Harford et al. (2008), we use Executive Compensation, which 
is the fraction of equity compensation received by the top five managers, measured as 
the ratio of stock option grants (SOG) divided to the summation of SOG, salary, and 
bonus compensation. The sample is divided into deciles: the highest three deciles of 
executive compensation are coded as one (i.e. good governance) and the lowest three 
deciles are coded as zero (i.e. poor governance).  
The presence of large shareholders plays an important role in addressing 
corporate agency problems. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that large shareholders 
perform a monitoring role and reduce the scope of managerial opportunism. Hence, 
we employ Institutional Ownership as the measure of large shareholder monitoring, 
defined as the sum of all ownership positions greater than 5% held by institutional 
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investors  (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007). Once again, the sample is split into 
deciles: the highest three deciles of institutional ownership are coded as one (i.e. good 
governance) and the lowest three deciles are coded as zero (i.e. poor governance).  
3.3 Model Specification 
To examine the impact of cash holdings on value, we first follow Faulkender & Wang 
(2006). The change in firm value is measured by the excess return for firm i during 
fiscal year t less the return of stock i‘s benchmark portfolio during fiscal year t. The 
benchmark portfolio is determined using Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-
market portfolios.  
For each year, we assign every firm into one of 25 size and BE/ME portfolios 
based on the intersection between size and book-to-market independent quintile sorts. 
Therefore, stock i‘s benchmark return at year t is the return of the portfolio to which 
stock i belongs at the beginning of fiscal year t. To calculate excess return for each 
firm, we subtract the return of the portfolio to which it belongs from the realized 
return of the stock (Faulkender & Wang, 2006, Liu & Mauer, 2011).  
Initially, we regress the excess return on changes in firm characteristics, 
focusing on the estimated coefficient that corresponds to unexpected change in cash. 
A second phase of analysis adopts a propensity score matching process to control for 
the difference between constrained and unconstrained firms. Finally, we use a 
difference-in-difference estimator on the matched sample to further analyse the 
impact of the financial crisis.  
3.3.1 Variable definitions 
Unexpected change in Cash Holdings 
We use the unexpected change in cash holdings rather than the actual change in cash 
holdings. Assuming that the market is efficient, the expected change in cash should be 
impounded into the market value of the firm at the beginning of the fiscal year and 
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therefore the change in market value should correspond to just the portion of the 
change in cash that is unexpected.  Accordingly, we follow Almeida et al. (2004) and 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) and estimate the following model to isolate the 
unexpected change in cash holdings (namely, the residual term from the estimated 
model): 
                                                                         
                                                                                                               
(1) 
In model (1), Cashholdings is cash plus marketable securities. Cashflow is 
earnings before extraordinary items and depreciation minus dividends. We include 
∆NWC and ∆ShortDebt, defined as the change in noncash net working capital, since 
working capital can be a substitute for cash (Almeida et al., 2004 & Opler et al., 1999). 
We control for Expenditures and Acquisition, since firms can use their cash savings to 
finance their investment expenditures and acquisitions (Opler et al., 1999). All 
variables are lagged and deflated by the lagged market value of assets (Faulkender 
and Wang, 2006). We also include Size defined as the natural log of assets and Q 
measured as the market value divides by the book value of assets (Opler et al., 1999). 
Control Variables 
Following Faulkender and Wang (2006), we include other firm specific factors that 
capture the effects of changes in firms‘ profitability, financing policy and investment 
policy. To control for changes in the firm‘s investment policy, we include total assets 
net of cash and research and development expenditures. According to Faulkender and 
Wang (2006), if a firm‘s cash reserves appear to be more than sufficient to fund both 
the short-term liabilities and any possible profitable investments, then shareholders 
would place a low value on a marginal dollar of cash, due to the higher corporate tax 
rate and the potential agency problem. This effect is controlled by including the 
interaction term. A negative sign is predicted. Moreover, the value of cash holdings 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
15 
 
could be correlated with firm‘s leverage. For firms with higher leverage, it is more 
likely that the value generated by additional cash would accrue to debt holders instead 
of shareholders. We interact cash with leverage and expect a negative sign. The 
control variable (except for excess return and leverage) are also deflated by the 1-year 
lagged market value of equity ( i, 1tM  ) calculated as number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by the stock‘s closing price at the fiscal year-end.  
3.3.2 Baseline model: Value of excess cash holdings 
The baseline model is specified in Equation 2.
12
 Of key interest is the 
coefficient on β4.  A positive coefficient is predicted to show that cash holdings are 
more valuable to constrained firms during the crisis.  
 
         
       
     
      
   
     
      
              
     
      
          
                                 
     
      
                                           
                                               
                                                                                 
 
             (2) 
where : ri,t =  return for firm i during fiscal year t;     
   stock i’s benchmark 
portfolio during fiscal year t determined using Fama & French size and book to 
market portfolios; ∆Ct  = the change in excess cash calculated as the difference 
between the actual change and the predicted change in cash holdings (estimated from 
Equation 1); Mi = the market value of equity; Dconstraint = 1 if a firm is identified as 
constrained and 0 if identified as unconstrained; DCrisis = 1 is the crisis dummy  and 
                                                          
12
 The variables included in Fama and French (1998) are quite similar to the variables included in our 
model (i.e. they also include interest expense, R&D and dividends paid in their regression model). The 
primary difference is the choice of dependent variable – Fama and French (1998) use market-to-book 
ratio. Equity returns are easier to interpret. Also, as recommend by Faulkender and Wang (2006), it is 
possible that the variability in market-to-book ratio detected by Fama and French (1998) results from 
the cross-sectional differences in accounting in terms of the book value of assets relative to the true 
replacement cost. If accounting methods across firms are correlated with liquidity, it might bias the 
estimates of the value of cash.  
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= 1 for the financial crisis period (2008 to 2010) and 0 for pre-crisis period (2002 to 
2007); Governance  is the corporate governance variable proxied alternatively using 
Institutional Ownership, E-Index and Executive Compensation. Our empirical setup is 
quite similar to a number of prior studies that also employ triple-interaction terms to 
gauge the crisis effect on other economic outcomes (see for example Albertazzi & 
Bottero (2014); Purnanandam (2009)).  
 
3.3.3 Impact of corporate governance 
To examine the impact of governance on the relation between cash holdings and firm 
value, and the change of the impact in times of financial crisis, we estimate Equation 
(3). A positive sign on β4 is predicted showing that cash is more valuable to good 
corporate governance firms during the crisis.  
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The combined effect of governance and financial constraints on the relation between 
cash holdings and value is tested in the following equation and a positive sign on β4 is 
predicted.  
         
       
     
      
   
     
      
                 
     
      
          
                                              
     
      
                                                    
                                                                                      
 
       
 (4)     
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3.3.4 Propensity score matching and the difference-in-difference estimator 
Problems can arise, using the baseline model. The inferences might be confounded by 
uncontrolled firm level heterogeneity. For instance, a firm having negative returns 
before the crisis may unsurprisingly perform poorly during the crisis. This firm 
heterogeneity can confound the estimates of the effect of cash holdings on firm value 
and, as such, it is difficult to isolate the crisis effect on cash holdings from the pre-
crisis periods. Therefore, a causal-effect cannot be unambiguously detected. While we 
include a number of control variables in the baseline regression, doing so cannot 
address the fact that the groups being compared could have different characteristics 
(Heckman et al., 1998). To address these potential problems, we follow Campello et 
al. (2010) and Kahle & Stulz (2013), and employ the matching estimator as a 
robustness check to our baseline analysis. 
 Following Campello et al. (2010), we label financially constrained firms as 
―treated‖ and a matched unconstrained firm as the control firm. Though a different 
setting to ours, we follow Kahle & Stulz (2013) and employ an adapted version of 
propensity score matching approach – firms are matched based on Cash Flow 
Volatility, M/B Ratio, Year and Industry (two digit SIC code).
13
 The propensity score 
match uses a probit model and we regress the financial constraint variable on cash 
flow volatility, M/B ratio, year and industry. The nearest-neighbour method is used to 
match the two groups. In addition, we require common support and do not allow for 
replacement. Once we identify the sample of constrained firms with the matched 
unconstrained sample, we run a regression based on the matched sample.
14
 
                                                          
13
 In Kahle & Stulz (2013), firms are matched according to operating cash flow, M/B ratio, cash 
holdings, size, and leverage ratio. However, operating cash flow and leverage are the main components 
of the WW Index. Size is the key to calculate HP Index. And cash holdings is the key variable of 
interest in our study. Thus, in our setting, we use Cash Flow Volatility, M/B ratio, industry and year to 
match constraint and unconstraint firms.  
14
 Our matching analysis is similar to Ozbas & Scharfstein (2010) who also perform regression analysis 
on a matched sample to alleviate the confounding effect induced by firm-level heterogeneity. 
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3.4 Sample selection and data 
The data for the majority of the variables in the regression models are sourced from 
COMPUSTAT over the period 2002 to 2010.
15
 The stock returns are downloaded 
from CRSP. The two datasets are matched based on GVKEY (Cross-sectional 
identifier) and Datadate (Time-series Identifier). For the financial constraint 
classifications, data for Bond and Paper ratings are retrieved from the COMPUSTAT 
Ratings File. Data for the calculation of the annual payout ratio, firm size, life cycle, 
collateral assets, the Whited & Wu index and Hadlock & Pierce (HP) index
16
  come 
from COMPUSTAT. Treasury Bill yields and the rate of Industrial Production are 
downloaded from the US Federal Reserve. Balance Sheet data are extracted at the end 
of each fiscal year, and earnings and expense data also are fiscal year end. Since the 
COMPUSTAT data date refers to the fiscal year end (rather than calendar year end), it 
is noted that that firms in our sample have different year ends. COMPUSTAT assigns 
the data year as the year in which the fiscal year begins if the fiscal year end is from 
January through May.  If the fiscal year end is from June through December, then the 
data year is the year in which the fiscal year ends. In the estimation of regression 
models, fiscal year is used to refer to each sample period.
17
 
To construct the sample, we follow Opler et al. (1999) and first exclude firms 
in Utility and Financial industries (with SIC codes between 4,900 and 4,999, and 
between 6,000 and 6,999, respectively), as these firms are subject to regulatory 
supervision and statutory capital requirements. American Depository Receipts (ADRs) 
are also excluded. Further, in light of Duchin et al. (2010), included firms have a 
                                                          
15
 We choose to begin our analysis in 2002 for several reasons. First, we wanted to avoid earlier 
multiple crisis periods that would unnecessarily complicate our analysis. Second, as discussed shortly, 
some of our key data (e.g. executive compensation) only are meaningfully available from this time 
forward. 
16
 Note that the HP index requires firm age, which is defined as the number of years since a firm‘s first 
appearance in CRSP.  
17
Sixteen percent of the firms have a fiscal year end from January to May. Hence their financial 
statements for the year ending in 2008 will span both our pre and post crisis period. We run our core 
analysis excluding these firms and our results are qualitatively the same. Details are available from the 
authors on request. 
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minimum $10 million in market capitalization, $25 million in total book value of 
assets and $0.5 million in cash holdings. Firm-year observations are excluded if cash 
holdings exceed the total book value of assets. Following Faulkender and Wang (2006) 
and Opler et al. (1999), firm-years with negative values for dividends, sales, capital 
expenditures or net assets are excluded.  
For corporate governance variables, data needed for the E-Index are 
downloaded from Riskmetrics and Executive Compensation data are retrieved from 
both COMPUSTAT Executive Compensation File (Execucomp) and Riskmetrics. 
Data for Institutional Ownership are collected from the 13-F filings in Thomson 
Financial. Prior to 2007 Riskmetrics only provides annual data for the years 2002 and 
2004. Following Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007), Harford et al. (2008), Bebchuk et al. 
(2009), we collect annual data for the years 2002 and 2004 and assume that index 
remains unchanged in the year following the most recent report. From 2007 
onwards,
18
 we have yearly data from Riskmetrics.   
To reduce the impact of outliers, we follow Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007) 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) and winsorize all the regression variables at the 1% 
level. We require firms to have at least 3 consecutive firm-year observations to be 
included in our sample. These criteria result in a final sample with 11,017 firm-year 
observations and 2,031 firms.
19
 
 
  
                                                          
18
 While Riskmetrics change their methodology to collect data since 2007, this change is unlikely to 
affect our study. 
19
 Notably, our sample size is comparable with Harford et al. (2008) who have 11,645 firm-year 
observations and 1,872 firms for the years 1993 through 2004. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the sample are reported in Table 2. The mean and median 
of risk adjusted return are 0.08 and -0.04, which are slightly higher than Faulkender & 
Wang (2006) who reported a -0.01 mean and -0.08 median. However, the first and 
third quartile of risk adjusted return in our study (-0.29 and 0.26) is at the similar 
magnitude to Faulkender &Wang (2006). Change of cash holdings (∆CashHoldingst) 
in our sample (0.02 and 0.007) are slightly greater than Faulkender & Wang (2006) 
who reported a 0.004 mean and a -0.001 median. But, the first and third quartile of 
change in cash (-0.03 and 0.05) is similar to their results (-0.03 and 0.03). The mean 
value of changes in R&D, interest expense and total dividends are quite small (-
0.0009, -0.0005 and 0.00003, respectively). However, these figures are similar to 
Faulkender & Wang (2006). The average E-Index is 2.66, which is comparable to 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) who reported an average of 2.24 and 2.49 for the 
E-Index in years 1990 and 2002, respectively. However, the total compensation in our 
sample is 11.85, which is slightly higher than Frydman and Saks (2010) who reported 
a 7.63 average total compensation for the period from 2000 to 2005. 
Table 3 reports summary statistics for each subsample of the corporate 
governance classifications and the financial constraint classifications. As shown in the 
table, firms with stronger shareholder rights (i.e. low E-Index) hold more cash (0.21 
mean and 0.15 median) than those with lower shareholder rights (i.e. high E-index) 
who have a 0.16 mean and 0.099 median, consistent with Harford et al. (2008). For 
executive compensation, firms with strong corporate governance (i.e. high 
compensation) hold more cash (a 0.224 mean and 0.180 median) than those with poor 
corporate governance (i.e. low compensation) (a 0.180 mean and a 0.116 median). 
Similar cash policies can be detected for institutional ownership subsamples, to the 
extent that good governance firms hold more cash than do poor governance firms.  
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On the other hand, firms with good corporate governance, for both E-Index 
and Equity Compensation, have higher positive actual change in cash for all the 
median values. These statistics suggest that firms with good corporate governance are 
more likely to increase their cash savings, compared to firms with poor corporate 
governance, which is consistent with Harford et al. (2008). In addition, better-
governed firms tend to be larger (Size) with higher earnings (Et) than counterpart 
poorly-governed firms. 
Turning to the constrained classifications, financially constrained firms have 
higher cash holdings than do financially unconstrained firms for all three 
classifications, indicating that cash holdings are more important for firms with the 
limited access to external capital markets. Moreover, consistent with Faulkender & 
Wang (2006), financially constrained firms have negative change in excess cash 
holdings under all three constraint classifications, but unconstrained firms have 
positive change in excess cash holdings. These summary statistics suggest that firms 
facing greater frictions in accessing external capital markets (i.e. constrained firms) 
are more likely to draw down their cash reserves compared to financially 
unconstrained firms. The intuition here is that constrained firms are more reliant on 
cash savings and therefore hold higher levels of cash than do firms that can easily 
raise funds via the capital market (Faulkender & Wang, 2006, Almeida et al., 2004).  
Table 3 also shows that for all classifications, the average earnings are higher 
for financially unconstrained firms than for financially constrained. Also, constrained 
firms tend to be smaller, and unconstrained firms have more debt, suggesting that 
financially constrained firms indeed have greater difficulty in raising external funds 
relative to unconstrained firms. 
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4.2 Estimation Results 
4.2.1 Constraint and crisis effects 
Table 4 reports the results from Equation (2), which analyses the impact of change in 
excess cash holdings on firm value, for constrained and unconstrained firms, before 
and during the financial crisis. We control for corporate governance (using 3 
alternative measures shown in Panels A-C), change in net assets, earnings, R&D 
expenditure, interest, debt, equity issuance and leverage. Each analysis is repeated for 
3 alternative classifications of financially constrained firms. The coefficient on 
change in excess cash holdings is significant and positive for five of the nine 
classifications, suggesting that an increase in excess cash holdings is positively 
associated with firm value.  
The interaction between change in excess cash and the financial crisis (β2) 
represents the crisis effect for unconstrained firms. The results are significant and 
positive for all the classifications, showing that for unconstrained firms, firm value 
increases for an increase in excess cash during the crisis period. The interaction terms 
for the cash and constraint dummy (β3) are significant and positive for most of the 
classifications, which is consistent with Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Denis & 
Sibilkov (2010). This result suggests that the equity market places a higher value on 
excess cash for constrained firms than for unconstrained firms in a non-crisis period.
20
 
Turning to the triple-interaction of cash with constraint and crisis effects (β4), 
the coefficients are all significant and negative for the Equity Compensation and 
Institutional Ownership proxies but insignificant for the E-Index classification of 
corporate governance. These results indicate that the crisis value effect for constrained 
                                                          
20
 However, we recognize that our results in this case are weaker than Faulkender and Wang (2006) 
who find that cash is more valuable for constrained firms under all the four classifications they employ. 
There are several reasons for the different strength of results between the two studies. First, Faulkender 
and Wang (2006) use sorting variables (i.e. payout ratio, size, bond and paper ratings) as the constraint 
criteria to classify their sample. Second, as discussed earlier, our sample period is different from their 
study. Third, Faulkender and Wang (2006) did not control for corporate governance. 
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firms is less than that of unconstrained firms. Our results are also important 
economically. According to our estimates of Table 4, we show that shareholders of a 
financially unconstrained firm under the WW Index criterion, only place a value of 
$0.34 on an extra dollar of cash in a non-crisis period.
21
  However, the value of an 
additional dollar will increase to $1.91 (=$0.34+$1.57) in the time of financial crisis 
for an unconstrained firm. On the other hand, an extra dollar of cash is valued by 
shareholders of a financially constrained firm at $2.04 (=$1.70+$0.34) in the pre-
crisis period, but the marginal value of cash will decrease to $0.91 
(=$0.34+$1.57+$1.70-$2.70) during the crisis. Stated differently, in the time of 
financial crisis, an extra dollar of cash is worth exactly $1 (=$1.91-$0.91) more for a 
financially unconstrained firm than a constrained firm. This result is opposite our 
prediction and we offer following explanations.  
As discussed in Section 2, constrained firms did not overly depend on external 
financing prior to the crisis, therefore they are less affected by the credit shock. 
Moreover, according to prior literature (Almeida et al. (2004)), constrained firms save 
cash to finance investments when external financing is difficult to obtain. However, 
according to the demand shock theory described by (Kahle & Stulz (2013), very few 
positive NPV projects were available during the crisis and corporate managers were 
unwilling to take on new projects due to their concern over market uncertainties. 
Hence, the decreased demand for investment would diminish the value of cash 
holdings to financially constrained firms during the crisis. Further, the constrained 
firms saved more cash during the pre-crisis period; hence, somewhat ironically they 
were better prepared for the crisis than unconstrained firms.  
                                                          
21
 As described in section 3.3.2, ∆Ct is divided by      , and stock return is the spread of (     
      ) divided by      . This standardization enables us to interpret the estimated coefficients as the 
dollar change in value for a one-dollar change in the corresponding independent variable (Faulkender 
& Wang, 2006).  
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On the other hand, consistent with the credit supply shock theory (Kahle & 
Stulz (2013)), unconstrained firms who rely heavily on external financing should be 
more affected during the crisis. Moreover, firms are likely heavily engaged in paying 
off their debt during a crisis. There is no doubt that financially unconstrained firms 
will have more debt outstanding than constrained firms. Hence, unconstrained firms 
are more likely to draw on their cash savings for debt retirement in an effort to reduce 
the risk of default. This means unconstrained firms can benefit more from extra cash 
holdings during the crisis, which would weaken the constraint effects on cash 
holdings for firm value.  
To assist in the interpretation of the test coefficients, Table 5 summarises the 
key interaction effects. As shown in the table, the cash effect on firm value for both 
constrained and unconstrained firms are mostly significant and positive in both the 
crisis and pre-crisis periods. These results confirm that cash holdings are positively 
related to firm value. Moreover, the constraint effect on cash holdings in the non-
crisis period are positive and significant for most of the classifications, which is 
consistent with Faulkender and Wang (2006). Turning to the crisis effect for 
constrained firms, the results are negative and significant for four constraint 
classifications but insignificant for three classifications. However, the crisis effect for 
unconstrained firms is significant and positive for all the constraint classifications. 
These results suggest that cash holdings become more important for financially 
unconstrained firms during the financial crisis, consistent with the estimates on the 
triple-interaction term reported in Table 4. 
The control variables also present interesting results.
22
 Firm value is positively 
associated with profitability (∆Et) and net financing (NFt), which is consistent with 
Faulkender and Wang (2006). Lagged cash holdings are positive and significant 
                                                          
22
 To conserve space and avoid repetition, we suppress discussion of the control variable estimation 
results for the remaining analysis.  
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across all classifications, but leverage is significantly negative. However, Faulkender 
and Wang (2006) show that significant coefficients on interactions between the 
change in cash with two variables, lagged cash and leverage. These two interaction 
terms are insignificant for most of the classifications in our study. The possible 
reasons for these differences relate to the discussion in the earlier footnote. Moreover, 
Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007) employ the same model as we do and they also show 
that these two interactions are insignificant if corporate governance is controlled.  
 
4.2.2 Governance and crisis effects 
Table 6 reports results from Equation (3), which compares/interacts governance and 
crisis effects on the relation between change in excess cash holdings and firm value 
across different classification methods.
23
 The estimated coefficients on change in 
excess cash holdings are significant and positive for all the nine classifications. 
Economically, the estimates range from $0.59 to $1.43, suggesting baseline cash 
holdings are positively associated with firm value. Turning to the interaction between 
governance and excess cash (∆Ct* Gov, β3), the results are insignificant for all the 
classifications (i.e. Governance effect in non-crisis period).  
These results are inconsistent with Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007) who find 
that the value of cash savings is greater if the firm is well-governed and we offer three 
possible explanations. First, our sample period (2002-2010) is different from their 
sample period (1990-2003). Second, Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007) do not cluster 
standard errors by firm and year but we do. Third, when estimating the governance 
effect on excess cash savings, Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith (2007) employ the Fama-
French (1998) model which is different from the model that we employ.  
                                                          
23
 While all models that we estimate include the full complement of control variables as outlined 
earlier, to conserve space, we only tabulate the results for our key test variables and interaction terms. 
Similarly, although not reported, we also perform a Wald test similar to that presented in Table 5. 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
26 
 
Turning to the interaction between change in excess cash holdings and 
financial crisis (β2), it is insignificant for most of the classifications. This coefficient 
represents the relation for poorly-governed firms, hence the crisis has little impact. 
While β2 is insignificant, β4 is positive and significant when we use Institutional 
Ownership and E-Index as proxies for corporate governance. The crisis effect for 
well-governed firms is represented by β2 + β4. Considering the governance effect in 
pre-crisis versus crisis periods (i.e. β3 vs. β4), we have the following intuition: while 
the governance effect on corporate cash holdings is unclear in the pre-crisis period, it 
becomes more pronounced and more positive during the financial crisis.  
The result is also economically significant. According to the first column of 
Table 6, shareholders place a value of $1.65 (=$1.43+$0.22) on an extra dollar of cash 
for a well-governed firm in the pre-crisis period, but the value will increase to $2.82 
(=$1.43-$0.07+$0.22+$1.24) during the financial crisis. In other words, the equity 
market places a higher value on each dollar of cash that well-governed firms hold 
during times of market stress.  
4.2.3 Governance and constraint effects 
Table 7 reports results from Equation (4), which compares the constraint and 
governance effects on excess cash holdings for firm value across different 
classification methods. The estimated coefficient on change in excess cash and 
constraint dummy (β3) shows some evidence that there is a constraint effect for firms 
with poor corporate governance. There is a governance effect on unconstrained firms 
(β2) for the institutional ownership classification, suggesting that large shareholders 
play a role in monitoring unconstrained (i.e. large firms) firm‘s cash policies.  
Turning to the triple-interaction of excess cash with governance and constraint 
effects (∆Ct* Gov*Dcons), the estimated coefficients are positive and significant for 
four classifications when we use Executive Compensation and E-Index as proxies for 
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corporate governance. This is consistent with our prediction that the positive 
governance effect on cash holdings becomes more pronounced for financially 
constrained firms, suggesting that corporate governance plays a more important role 
in monitoring cash deployment for firms with limited access to external financing.  
However, for the institutional ownership classification, the triple-interaction (∆Ct* 
Gov*Dcons) is insignificant. This possibly occurs because institutional owners are 
less inclined to invest in financially constrained firms (i.e. small firms) and, hence, 
have a limited monitoring role.  
Collectively, the results provide the following intuition: while the governance 
effect on corporate cash holdings is unclear for unconstrained firms, it becomes more 
pronounced for financially constrained firms. Hence, investors are more likely to 
place a higher value on each dollar of excess cash for constrained firms with good 
corporate governance.  
 
4.3 Propensity Score Matching Analysis 
Table 8, Panel A reports the results of estimating Equation (2), using the matched 
sample, excluding the control variables since firm heterogeneity is captured by the 
matching process. Panels B and C include the governance control. The financially 
constrained firms are defined as treated firms and unconstrained firms as control 
firms.  
The interaction between change in excess cash and financial crisis (β2) is 
significant and positive for most of the classifications. The value of cash increases for 
unconstrained firms in a financial crisis. This result is consistent with the baseline 
regression results presented in Table 4. Moreover, the estimated coefficient on the 
interaction term on cash and constraint dummy (β3) is significant and positive for 
most of the classifications, showing that cash is of higher value to constrained firms. 
Again this result is consistent with the baseline model and Faulkender and Wang 
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(2006) and Denis & Sibilkov (2010).  
Turning to the triple-interaction of cash with constraint and crisis effects (i.e. 
∆Ct*Dcrisis*Dcons), the coefficients are significant and negative for most of the 
classifications. These results suggest that the impact of cash on firm value becomes 
less positive for constrained firms in times of financial crisis. According to the first 
column of Panel B in Table 8, the value of an extra dollar of cash for constrained 
firms will decrease from $1.58 in the pre-crisis period to $0.35 in the crisis period. 
Although inconsistent with our initial expectations the result is consistent with the 
baseline regression estimations. We conclude that there is no additional value of extra 
cash holding for constrained firms in a financial crisis.
24
 
 Panel D of Table 8 shows results where corporate governance is measured 
using the EE Index. The triple-interaction becomes positive and significant. Recall 
that the triple-interaction for E-Index in Table 4 was insignificant. Moreover, β3 (∆Ct 
*Dcons) becomes insignificant on the matched sample in Table 8. The positive effects 
shown on the triple-interaction term (i.e. the constraint effects in the crisis period) are 
possibly induced from losing the constraint effects from the non-crisis period (β3).
25
  
5. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper we examine the impact of excess cash holdings on firm value in the 
context of financial constraints, the financial crisis and corporate governance. The 
economic rationale underlying the relevance of cash flows is based on market 
                                                          
24
 Given the weaker constraint effect we found, we perform additional difference-in-difference 
estimation of cash holdings for financially constrained and unconstrained firms on a matched sample. 
The difference-in-difference matching estimator allows us to avoid the problem of omitted time trends 
and enables us to control unobserved differences between firms by looking at the matched pairs before 
and during the crisis. In unreported analysis, the test shows that the change of cash holdings between 
constrained and unconstrained firms are indistinguishable during the crisis, suggesting that the 
constraint effect on cash holdings do not become more pronounced. Details are available from the 
authors upon request. 
25
 We also test the constrained and governance effect using the matching sample. In unreported analysis 
we find there is some evidence showing that the governance effect on cash holdings is more significant 
for constrained firms (i.e. consistent with earlier results reported in Table 7), suggesting that financially 
constrained firms benefit more from a well-governed cash deployment. Details are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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imperfections. The financial crisis represents a credit supply shock and changes the 
access to external capital markets for firms, potentially changing the relevance of the 
amount of cash holdings to firm value.  Our research examines financially constrained 
versus unconstrained firms, and the impact of corporate governance. The pre-crisis 
time frame examined is 2002-2007, while the crisis period is defined as 2008-2010. 
Generally, we find that excess cash holdings are positively related to firm 
value. Further, there is some evidence to show cash holdings is more valuable to 
constrained firms, compared to unconstrained firms. The value impact is also more 
pronounced during the crisis. The triple-interaction of cash with constraint and crisis 
effects show a strong negative effect for the total compensation proxy for corporate 
governance. That is, the crisis value effect for constrained firms is less than that of 
unconstrained firms. We offer following explanations. On the one hand, constrained 
firms have lower reliance on external financing prior to the crisis and, hence, are less 
affected by the financial crisis. On the other hand, unconstrained firms rely heavily on 
external financing and therefore should be more affected by the crisis. Moreover, the 
decreased in demand for investment would diminish the value of cash holdings to 
financially constrained firms. Nevertheless, unconstrained firms are more likely to 
draw on their cash savings for debt retirement in an effort to reduce the risk of default. 
This means unconstrained firms can benefit more from extra cash holdings during the 
crisis. Therefore, constraint effects on cash holdings for firm value will be weakened. 
Our analysis also shows that while the governance effect on corporate cash 
holdings is unclear in the pre-crisis period, it becomes more pronounced and more 
positive during the financial crisis. The equity market places a higher value on each 
dollar of cash that well-governed firms hold during times of market stress. Finally, the 
triple-interaction of excess cash with governance and constraint effects generally 
show a positive effect, suggesting that the positive governance effect on corporate 
cash holdings becomes more pronounced for firms that are financially constrained. 
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Appendix A 
Summary of methods for classifying firms as constrained or unconstrained 
Method Reference/s Description 
1. Annual 
Payout 
Ratio 
Faulkender & 
Wang, 2006; Denis 
& Sibilkov, 2010 
High payout ratios show that the firm has funds to meet debt 
obligations and finance investments. Payout ratio is defined 
as the ratio of dividends and common stock repurchases to 
operating income.  Funds are ranked annually based on the 
payout ratio and those in the bottom (top) three deciles are 
assigned to the financially constrained (unconstrained group. 
2. Firm Size 
Faulkender & 
Wang, 2006; 
Almeida et al., 2004 
Small firms tend to be younger and less well known, and 
therefore have limited access to external financial markets. 
Firms are ranked annaully based on their total assets and 
assigned to the financially constrained (unconstrained) group 
those firms in the bottom (top) three deciles. 
3. Bond 
Rating 
Denis & Sibilkov, 
2010; 
Almeida et al., 2004 
 
Firms with a debt rating are assumed to have a stronger 
financial position. Therefore, firms are classified as 
financially unconstrained if their bonds have been rated 
during the sample period and their debt is not in default 
Firms are classified as constrained if they have never had 
their debt rated during our sample period or if their long-term 
debt rating is unavailable. Observations are only categorized 
in the constrained subsample when the firms report positive 
debt. 
4. Paper 
Rating. 
Denis & Sibilkov, 
2010; 
Almeida et al., 2004 
 
Similar to bond rating firms are sort firms according to their 
commercial paper ratings. Firms are classified as financially 
constrained if they have never had their issues rated during 
our sample period, and they have debt outstanding that year. 
Firms receiving paper ratings at some point during the 
sample period are considered as unconstrained firms. 
5. Life Cycle 
 
DeAngeloa, 
DeAngeloa and 
Stulz (2006) 
Life cycle is defined as the ratio of retained earnings to total 
assets. Firms with low retained earnings tend to be in the 
expansion stage with greater investment opportunities and 
therefore are defined as unconstrained firms. Firms with high 
retained earnings are more likely to be in the declining stage 
with fewer growth opportunities, and therefore are defined as 
financially constrained firms. 
6. Collateral 
Assets 
Almeida & 
Campello, 2007 
Collateral assets is defined as the sum of inventory and 
property, plant and equipment over total assets (Inventory 
+PPT)/Assets. Firms with greater collateral assets are more 
tangible, sustain more external financing, because collateral 
assets increase the value that can be captured by creditors in 
default states. Therefore, firms with high (low) collateral 
assets are defined as unconstrained (constrained) firms. 
7. Whited & 
Wu (WW) 
Index 
Whited & Wu, 2006 
The WW index uses a number of firm specific factors that 
capture financial conditions, converted to an index as 
follows:  
                                           
                            
                                             
Firms are classified as unconstrained (constrained) if they 
rank in the bottom (top) three deciles of the WW Index.  
8. Hadlock & 
Pierce (HP) 
Index 
Hadlock & Pierce, 
2010 
This method uses a quadratic relation between size and 
constrains, and a linear relation between age and constraints, 
to develop the following equation: 
2 0.737* 0.043* 0.040*HP Index Size Size Age     
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Table 1: Sample Distribution for Voting Method 
This table shows the number of observations that have been classified as financially constrained on 1 
through to 6 classification methods. The 6 methods are annual payout ratio, firm size, bond rating, 
paper rating, life cycle and collateral assets. The numbers in the table represent the count of the number 
of classification methods that define a particular observation as financially constrained. For example, a 
count of 312 in 2002 under the score of 2 means there are 312 observations that are classified as 
financially constrained by 2 methods.  
Number of methods where firms-year observations are classified as financial constrained 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2002 72 204 312 286 212 74 1 
2003 70 215 315 324 215 73 0 
2004 67 236 328 321 218 78 1 
2005 72 233 333 319 228 79 1 
2006 66 239 331 343 227 71 0 
2007 72 241 320 357 217 88 2 
2008 59 259 314 342 202 71 1 
2009 57 245 312 329 218 62 0 
2010 62 209 292 306 159 55 2 
Total 597 2081 2857 2927 1896 651 8 
Total <4 
   
8462 
   Total >4 
    
2555 
   
 
 
 
 
  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
37 
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for the whole Sample 
This table provides summary statistics for the whole sample over the period from 2002 to 2010.  
         
  is excess return where      is the stock return for firm i during fiscal year t and     
  is stock i’s 
benchmark portfolio during fiscal year t determined using Fama & French size and book to market 
portfolios;  Ct is cash plus marketable securities; . ∆CashHoldingst is the change of cash holdings.  ∆Ct 
is the difference between actual change in cash and the expected change in cash which is modelled 
based on Almeida et al. (2004). Et is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest. NAt is total 
assets minus cash holdings. RDt is R&D expenditures. It is interest expense, Dt are total dividends paid, 
Lt is Leverage measured as total debt over the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. NFt is 
total equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption. Total Compensation 
is the top five management total compensation. E-Index is the entrenchment index suggested by 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2006).  ∆Xt is compact notation for the 1-year change, Xt –Xt-1. All the 
variables (except for excess return, leverage, E-Index, Total Compensation) are deflated by the lagged 
market value of equity (Mi,t-1).   
Variable Mean Median Std Dev 1
st
 Quartile 3
rd
 Quartile 
ri,t-Ri,t 0.07586 -0.03813 0.66877 -0.29143 0.26174 
∆CashHoldingst 0.02053 0.00666 0.16842 -0.02775 0.05142 
∆Ct 0.00913 -0.00102 0.16402 -0.03840 0.04135 
Ct 0.24583 0.16721 0.23181 0.06176 0.37095 
Ct-1 0.21346 0.12801 0.26495 0.05475 0.26452 
∆Et 0.04235 0.00738 0.29782 -0.01955 0.03798 
E-Index 2.66104 3.00000 1.37360 2.00000 4.00000 
Total Compensation 11.8512 7.67035 12.11729 4.14895 14.79539 
∆NAt 0.03311 0.02131 0.39047 -0.03594 0.09577 
∆RDt -0.00088 0.00003 0.03667 -0.00088 0.00483 
∆It -0.00053 0.00000 0.01875 -0.00171 0.00118 
∆Dt 0.00003 0.00000 0.01484 0.00000 0.00003 
Size 3359.64 421.15 11470.00 125.13 1702.94 
Lt 0.16131 0.09130 0.19612 0.00154 0.24631 
NFt 0.35656 0.03296 1.26101 0.00285 0.20622 
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Table 3:  Summary Statistics for each Subsample 
This table provides summary statistics for good and poor corporate governance firms, and financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Corporate governance is classified based 
on Total Compensation and E-Index. For Total Compensation, a good (poor) corporate governance firm is identified if the firm is ranked in the top (bottom) three deciles of top five 
total executive compensation. E-Index is the entrenchment index suggested by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2006). We use the medium E-Index value to split the sample each year. A 
good governance firm is identified if it has a E-Index less than the medium value. Financially constrained firms are identified by using HP Index, WW Index and the Voting Method 
(see text for definitions for each criterion). Cash holdings (Ct) is cash plus marketable securities. ∆CashHoldingst is the change of cash holdings.  ∆Ct is the difference between actual 
change in cash and the expected change in cash which is modelled based on Almeida et al. (2004). Earnings (Et) is before extraordinary items plus interest. Size refers to book value of 
assets. Total Debtt is measured as sum of long term and short term debt. Cash holdings, Earnings and Total Debt are deflated by total book assets. 
 
  
Corporate Governance Classifications Financial Constraint Classifications 
  
E-index Exec. Compensation Inst. Ownership HP Index WW Index Voting Method 
Variable 
 
Poor Good Poor Good Poor Good Cons Uncons Cons Uncons Cons Uncons 
∆CashHoldingst Mean 0.018 0.020 0.025 0.025 0.018 0.014 0.007 0.028 -0.004 0.038 0.018 0.021 
 Med 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.008 -0.001 0.008 0.005 0.007 
Ct Mean 0.160 0.209 0.180 0.224 0.249 0.251 0.363 0.141 0.354 0.181 0.293 0.232 
 Med 0.099 0.145 0.116 0.180 0.160 0.177 0.304 0.091 0.303 0.102 0.208 0.155 
∆Ct Mean 0.011 0.012 0.017 0.016 0.008 0.002 -0.013 0.023 -0.023 0.030 0.003 0.011 
 Med 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.004 -0.016 0.005 -0.020 0.005 -0.008 0.000 
Et Mean 0.043 0.050 0.041 0.068 -0.000 -0.010 -0.080 0.062 -0.110 0.045 -0.066 0.023 
 Med 0.064 0.069 0.061 0.078 0.058 0.040 0.008 0.070 -0.019 0.070 0.016 0.059 
Size Mean 4151.59 7751.21 3717.99 8329.74 4831.19 1481.13 82.1 10924.4 114.4 9291.8 324.6 4276.0 
 Med 1540.50 1307.87 829.54 2558.20 274.80 422.96 75.3 3464.2 88.4 2695.0 109.4 685.1 
Total Debtt Mean 0.217 0.188 0.193 0.188 0.172 0.192 0.110 0.254 0.129 0.223 0.167 0.187 
 Med 0.206 0.157 0.166 0.171 0.117 0.142 0.026 0.234 0.031 0.204 0.105 0.141 
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Table 4: Testing Constraint and Crisis Effects in the Value-Excess Cash Linkage  
This table presents results of estimating Equation (2).The dependent variable in all regressions is excess return (         
 ) where       is the stock return for firm i during 
fiscal year t, and     
  is stock i‘s benchmark return at year t. All the variables (except for excess return and leverage) are deflated by the lagged market value of equity 
(Mi,t-1). ∆Ct is the realized 1-year change in cash relative to the expected change in cash (model details are provided in Section 3.3.1). Ct is cash plus marketable 
securities; NAt is total assets minus cash holdings. Et is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest. RDt is R&D expenditures. It is the interest expense, Dt are total 
dividends paid, NFt is total equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption. Lt is Leverage is measured as total debt over the sum of total 
debt and the market value of equity. ∆Xt is compact notation for the 1-year change, Xt –Xt-1. Dcrisis is a period dummy which equals 1 for financial crisis period (2008 to 
2010) and 0 for pre-crisis period (2002 to 2007). Financially constrained and unconstrained firms are classified by using HP Index, WW index and the Voting Method 
(see text for definitions for each criteria). Dcons is the constraint dummy that equals 1 if a firm is identified as constrained and 0 if identified as unconstrained by the 
respective criterion. Governance is defined according to Institutional Ownership (DOwner), Executive Compensation (DComp) and Eindex.  DOwner and DComp are 
governance dummies that equal 1 if a firm is identified as good corporate governance and 0 if identified as poor governance based on whether the firm was in the top or 
bottom three deciles of institutional ownership or top five executive compensation (details are provided in Section 3.2). E-Index is the entrenchment index based on 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2006). Statistical significance is computed using standard errors robust to clustering by firm and year. Coefficient estimates are reported 
with t-statistics in parentheses. *corresponds to significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
  Panel A: Institutional Ownership Panel B: Equity Compensation Panel C: E-Index 
  
HP 
Index 
WW 
Index 
Voting 
Method 
HP 
Index 
WW 
Index 
Voting 
Method 
HP 
Index 
WW 
Index 
Voting 
Method 
Intercept α 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.01 
  (3.93)*** (4.29)*** (0.91) (1.80)* (2.65)*** (0.98) (1.15) (1.16) (-0.31) 
∆Ct β1 0.33 0.34 1.06 0.43 0.46 0.53 0.58 0.38 0.75 
  (1.56) (1.35) (3.85)*** (0.99) (1.62) (2.67)*** (3.00)*** (2.90)*** (5.69)*** 
∆Ct*Dcrisis     β 2 1.87 1.57 0.76 1.41 1.48 1.05 0.72 0.76 0.64 
  (3.44)*** (3.45)*** (1.84)* (2.45)** (4.22)*** (1.86)* (2.32)** (3.96)*** (1.77)* 
∆Ct*Dcons β 3 1.54 1.70 0.75 2.50 3.02 1.63 0.36 1.18 0.07 
  (3.10)*** (6.76)*** (4.43)*** (2.31)** (4.21)*** (2.40)** (0.91) (2.54)** (0.32) 
∆Ct*Dcrisis*Dcons β 4 -2.80 -2.70 -2.11 -2.70 -3.13 -2.52 0.42 -0.69 0.12 
  (-4.87)*** (-4.78)*** (-5.15)*** (-2.20)** (-3.27)*** (-2.80)*** (0.85) (-1.50) (0.47) 
Dcrisis*Dcons β 5 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.19 -0.00 0.07 0.02 -0.03 
  (-0.39) (-0.51) (-0.85) (-0.96) (-2.04)** (-0.07) (0.80) (0.18) (-0.83) 
Dcons β 6 -0.08 -0.10 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.14 -0.17 -0.07 
  (-1.95)* (-3.05)*** (0.52) (0.44) (-0.52) (-0.69) (-2.23)** (-1.69)* (-2.81)*** 
Dcrisis β 7 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 
  (0.78) (0.70) (1.97)** (1.55) (1.69)* (1.19) (0.99) (0.74) (0.96) 
Governance β 8 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (-2.86)*** (-2.91)*** (-5.47)*** (-1.86)* (-1.43) (-0.36) (2.06)** (1.83)* (1.38) 
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Table 4 continued  
  Panel A: Institutional Ownership Panel B: Equity Compensation Panel C: E-Index 
  
HP 
Index 
WW 
Index 
Voting 
Method 
HP 
Index 
WW 
Index 
Voting 
Method 
HP 
Index 
WW 
Index 
Voting 
Method 
∆NAt β 9 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.09 
  (2.40)** (3.54)*** (3.32)*** (1.32) (1.46) (0.91) (2.81)*** (4.04)*** (4.58)*** 
∆Et β 10 0.39 0.38 0.44 0.28 0.33 0.44 0.35 0.34 0.44 
   (5.17)*** (5.74)*** (5.07)*** (3.41)*** (3.07)*** (6.36)*** (7.89)*** (15.37)*** (7.40)*** 
∆RDt β11 -1.26 -1.02 -1.03 -1.57 -1.67 -1.07 -0.86 -1.76 -1.10 
   (-1.99)** (-2.19)** (-2.60)*** (-1.90)* (-1.97)** (-1.27) (-3.19)*** (-3.28)*** (-1.96)* 
∆It β12 -0.69 -0.98 -1.12 -1.63 -2.53 -1.54 -3.24 -3.65 -2.99 
  (-0.60) (-0.92) (-1.15) (-0.76) (-1.45) (-0.99) (-2.32)** (-2.69)*** (-2.99)*** 
∆Dt β13 1.24 1.38 1.79 0.89 1.30 2.10 0.88 1.30 1.30 
   (1.92)* (1.84)* (2.66)*** (1.48) (1.31) (2.33)** (1.24) (2.14)** (1.24) 
NFt β14 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 
  (2.28)** (2.37)** (2.73)*** (1.69)* (1.66)* (3.05)*** (5.04)*** (3.50)*** (2.50)** 
L β15 -0.58 -0.59 -0.52 -0.45 -0.42 -0.46 -0.46 -0.41 -0.41 
   (-6.92)*** (-5.37)*** (-5.29)*** (-4.38)*** (-5.59)*** (-6.11)*** (-6.30)*** (-8.01)*** (-6.57)*** 
Ct-1 β16 0.50 0.51 0.40 0.44 0.49 0.41 0.30 0.31 0.29 
  (2.40)** (2.49)** (2.20)** (2.72)*** (5.49)*** (2.94)*** (3.45)*** (4.16)*** (2.68)*** 
∆Ct* Ct-1 β17 -0.11 -0.30 -0.24 0.41 -0.19 0.43 -0.19 -0.43 -0.07 
   (-0.19) (-0.72) (-0.95) (0.96) (-0.56) (1.14) (-0.78) (-1.18) (-0.40) 
∆Ct *L β18 -1.06 -0.76 -1.22 -0.76 -0.89 -1.18 -0.32 0.21 -0.70 
  (-1.52) (-1.73)* (-2.53)** (-0.96) (-1.30) (-2.75)*** (-0.64) (0.40) (-1.48) 
Obs  3,539 3,973 5,811 2,100 2,126 3,694 2,974 3,020 5,109 
Adj R
2
  0.218 0.222 0.213 0.275 0.291 0.219 0.204 0.212 0.190 
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Table 5: Coefficient Combinations in Estimation of Equation (2) 
This table gives a comparison of the impact of change in cash on firm value, considering financial 
constraints and crisis effects, across different classification methods. Wald tests are performed on various 
combinations of coefficients in Equation (2). The sum of coefficients and significant tests correspond to 
regression estimates reported in Table 4. 
 
Panel A: Institutional Ownership 
 Test  HP 
Index 
WW 
Index 
Voting 
Method 
Constrained firm in a Crisis Period β1+ β 2+ β 3+ β 4 = 0 0.94 0.91 0.46 
  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.03)** 
Unconstrained firm in a Crisis Period β1+ β 2 = 0 2.2 1.91 1.82 
  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Constrained Effect in a Crisis Period β 3+ β 4 = 0 -1.26 -1.00 -1.36 
  (0.02)** (0.04)** (0.00)*** 
Constrained firm in a Non-Crisis Period β1+ β 3 = 0 1.87 2.04 1.81 
  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Unconstrained firm in a Non-Crisis Period β1 = 0 0.33 0.34 1.06 
  (0.11) (0.17) (0.00)*** 
Constrained effect in Non-Crisis Period β 3 = 0 1.54 1.7 0.75 
  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Crisis Effect for constrained firms β 2+ β 4 = 0 -0.93 -1.13 -1.35 
  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Crisis Effect for unconstrained firms β 2 = 0 1.87 1.57 0.76 
  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.06)* 
Panel B: Executive Compensation  
  
HP 
Index 
WW 
Index 
Voting 
Method 
Constrained firm in a Crisis Period β1+ β 2+ β 3+ β 4 = 0 1.64 1.83 0.69 
  (0.05)** (0.00)*** (0.35) 
Unconstrained firm in a Crisis Period β1+ β 2 = 0 1.84 1.94 1.58 
  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Constrained Effect in a Crisis Period β 3+ β 4 = 0 -0.2 -0.11 -0.89 
  (0.76) (0.62) (0.03)** 
Constrained firm in a Non-Crisis Period β1+ β 3 = 0 2.93 3.48 2.16 
  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Unconstrained firm in a Non-Crisis Period β1 = 0 0.43 0.46 0.53 
  (0.32) (0.10)* (0.00)*** 
Constrained effect in Non-Crisis Period β 3 = 0 2.5 3.02 1.63 
  (0.02)** (0.00)*** (0.01)** 
Crisis Effect for constrained firms β 2+ β 4 = 0 -1.29 -1.65 -1.47 
  (0.34) (0.02)** (0.15) 
Crisis Effect for unconstrained firms β 2 = 0 1.41 1.48 1.05 
  (0.01)** (0.00)*** (0.06)** 
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Table 5 continued  
 
  
Panel C: E-Index      
 Test 
HP 
Index 
WW 
Index 
Voting 
Method 
Constrained firm in a Crisis Period β1+ β 2+ β 3+ β 4 = 0 2.08 1.63 1.58 
  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Unconstrained firm in a Crisis Period β1+ β 2 = 0 1.3 1.14 1.39 
  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Constrained Effect in a Crisis Period β 3+ β 4 = 0 0.78 0.49 0.19 
  (0.03)*** (0.04)** (0.27) 
Constrained firm in a Non-Crisis Period β1+ β 3 = 0 0.94 1.56 0.82 
  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Unconstrained firm in a Non-Crisis Period β1 = 0 0.58 0.38 0.75 
  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Constrained effect in Non-Crisis Period β 3 = 0 0.36 1.18 0.07 
  (0.36) (0.01)** (0.74) 
Crisis Effect for constrained firms β 2+ β 4 = 0 1.14 0.07 0.76 
  (0.08)* (0.89) (0.02)** 
Crisis Effect for unconstrained firms β 2 = 0 0.72 0.76 0.64 
  (0.02)** (0.00)*** (0.08)* 
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Table 6: Governance and Crisis Effects in the Value-Excess Cash Linkage 
This table presents results of estimating equation (3), which compares the different governance effects of cash holdings on firm value between the financial crisis period and pre-
crisis period. The table reports the results for the key variables only – the control variables estimates are not reported to conserve space. The dependent variable in all regressions is 
excess return (         
 )  where        is the stock return for firm i during fiscal year t, and      
  is stock i‘s benchmark return at year t. All the variables (except for excess return 
and leverage) are deflated by the lagged market value of equity (Mi,t-1). ∆Ct is compact notation for excess change in cash – namely, the realized 1-year change in cash relative to 
the expected change in cash (model details are provided in Section 3.3.1). Dcrisis is a period dummy which equals 1 for financial crisis period (2008 to 2010) and 0 for pre-crisis 
period (2002 to 2007). Financially constrained and unconstrained firms are classified by the HP Index, WW index and the Voting Method (see text for definitions for each criteria). 
Dcons is the constraint dummy that equals 1 if a firm is identified as constrained and 0 if identified as unconstrained by the respective criterion. Gov is defined according to (1) 
institutional ownership (DOwner), (2) total compensation (DComp) and (3) E-Index. DOwner and DComp are governance dummies that equal 1 if a firm is identified as 
good corporate governance and 0 if identified as poor governance based on whether the firm was in the top or bottom three deciles of institutional ownership or 
top five executive compensation (details are provided in Section 3.2). Statistical significance is computed using standard errors robust to clustering by firm and year. 
Coefficient estimates are reported with are reported in parentheses for the OLS regressions. Coefficient estimates are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. *corresponds to 
significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; and ***significant at 1%. 
  Panel A: Institutional Ownership Panel B: Equity Compensation Panel C: E-Index 
  HP  
Index 
WW  
Index 
Voting 
 Method 
HP  
Index 
WW  
Index 
Voting 
 Method 
HP  
Index 
WW  
Index 
Voting 
 Method 
Intercept α 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
  (1.32) (1.06) (1.14) (1.54) (0.94) (1.05) (0.11) (0.04) (-0.32) 
∆Ct β1 1.43 1.22 1.27 1.34 1.07 0.81 0.64 0.59 0.68 
  (4.17)*** (4.97)*** (4.21)*** (3.87)*** (3.61)*** (4.15)*** (3.28)*** (2.90)*** (6.05)*** 
∆Ct*Dcrisis     β2 -0.07 -0.13 0.09 1.08 1.32 0.79 -0.09 0.04 -0.23 
  (-0.22) (-0.61) (0.30) (1.59) (2.21)** (1.26) (-0.23) (0.11) (-0.85) 
∆Ct* Gov β3 0.22 -0.05 -0.06 -0.76 -0.66 -0.26 0.04 0.02 0.02 
  (1.10) (-0.41) (-0.60) (-0.95) (-0.92) (-0.75) (0.38) (0.31) (0.35) 
∆Ct*Gov*Dcrisis β4 1.24 1.14 0.72 0.25 -0.00 0.07 0.28 0.20 0.26 
  (3.59)*** (2.52)** (1.88)* (0.26) (-0.00) (0.13) (2.25)** (1.65)* (2.59)*** 
Gov *Dcrisis β5 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 
  (2.25)** (1.02) (1.60) (2.51)** (2.25)** (1.48) (-0.74) (-0.22) (-0.03) 
Governance β6 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
  (-4.26)*** (-3.91)*** (-10.57)*** (-2.61)*** (-0.62) (-0.62) (2.56)** (1.67)* (1.08) 
Dcrisis β7 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.04 
  (0.07) (0.33) (0.41) (0.42) (0.27) (0.70) (1.27) (0.86) (0.67) 
Obs  3,539 3,973 5,811 2,100 2,126 3,694 2,974 3,020 5,109 
Adj R
2
  0.205 0.194 0.210 0.255 0.239 0.212 0.199 0.187 0.190 
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Table 7: Constraint and Governance Effects in the Value-Excess Cash Linkage 
This table presents results of estimating equation (4), which compares the different constraint effects of cash holdings on firm value between good and poor governance firms. The 
table reports the results for the key variables only – the control variables estimates are not reported to conserve space. The dependent variable in all regressions is excess return 
(         
 ) where        is the stock return for firm i during fiscal year t, and    
  is stock i‘s benchmark return at year t. All the variables (except for excess return and leverage) are 
deflated by the lagged market value of equity (Mi,t-1). ∆Ct is compact notation for excess change in cash – namely, the realized 1-year change in cash relative to the expected change 
in cash (model details are provided in Section 3.3.1). Dcrisis is a period dummy which equals 1 for financial crisis period (2008 to 2010) and 0 for pre-crisis period (2002 to 2007). 
Financially constrained and unconstrained firms are classified by the HP Index, WW index and the Voting Method (see text for definitions for each criteria). Dcons is the 
constraint dummy that equals 1 if a firm is identified as constrained and 0 if identified as unconstrained by the respective criterion. Gov is defined according to (1) institutional 
ownership (DOwner), (2) total compensation (DComp) and (3) E index. DOwner and DComp are governance dummies that equal 1 if a firm is identified as good 
corporate governance and 0 if identified as poor governance based on whether the firm was in the top or bottom three deciles of institutional ownership or top 
five executive compensation (details are provided in Section 3.2).  Statistical significance is computed using standard errors robust to clustering by firm and year. 
Coefficient estimates are reported with are reported in parentheses for the OLS regressions. Coefficient estimates are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. *corresponds to 
significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; and ***significant at 1%. 
  Panel A: Institutional Ownership Panel B: Equity Compensation Panel C: E-Index 
  HP  
Index 
WW  
Index 
Voting 
 Method 
HP  
Index 
WW  
Index 
Voting 
 Method 
HP  
Index 
WW  
Index 
Voting 
 Method 
Intercept α 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.00 
  (3.19)*** (3.87)*** (2.34)** (2.36)** (2.84)*** (1.66)* (1.55) (1.13) (0.07) 
∆Ct β1 0.54 0.57 1.22 0.91 0.74 0.88 0.37 0.29 0.43 
  (1.32) (2.23)** (4.68)*** (1.66)* (2.67)*** (3.69)*** (2.12)** (1.55) (3.81)*** 
∆Ct* Gov β2 0.89 0.56 0.22 -0.54 -0.34 -0.35 0.13 0.07 0.19 
  (3.68)*** (3.31)*** (1.58) (-1.07) (-0.57) (-1.34) (1.52) (1.08) (2.11)** 
∆Ct*Dcons β3 1.08 1.26 0.25 1.52 2.12 0.81 -0.23 0.37 0.30 
  (1.27) (2.05)** (0.44) (1.59) (3.00)*** (1.35) (-0.70) (0.58) (0.50) 
∆Ct* Gov*Dcons β4 -0.59 -0.66 0.04 14.62 6.33 1.09 0.35 0.31 -0.07 
  (-0.75) (-1.05) (0.05) (2.57)** (2.73)*** (0.73) (2.36)** (2.48)** (-0.30) 
Gov*Dcons β5 -0.05 -0.05 0.05 0.31 0.23 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
  (-1.31) (-1.61) (1.46) (2.66)*** (3.01)*** (-0.08) (0.20) (-0.29) (-0.59) 
Dcons β6 -0.08 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 -0.12 -0.03 -0.15 -0.12 -0.06 
  (-2.12)** (-3.17)*** (-0.63) (-0.43) (-1.79)* (-0.99) (-1.28) (-0.58) (-2.29)** 
Governance β7 -0.05 -0.05 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
  (-2.31)** (-3.16)*** (-7.05)*** (-1.78)* (-1.96)* (-0.23) (2.51)** (2.68)*** (1.43) 
Obs  3,539 3,973 5,811 2,100 2,126 3,694 2,974 3,020 5,109 
Adj R
2
  0.209 0.209 0.206 0.262 0.265 0.206 0.200 0.209 0.186 
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Table 8: Matching Analysis Testing Constraint and Crisis Effects in the Value-Excess Cash Linkage 
This table presents results of estimating Equation (2) on a matched sample. Following Campello et al. (2010) and Kahle & Stulz (2013), financial constrained and 
unconstrained firms are matched according cash flow volatility, M/B Ratio, industry and year. ∆Ct is compact notation for the realized 1-year change in cash 
relative to the expected change in cash. Dcrisis is a period dummy which equals 1 for financial crisis period (2008 to 2010) and 0 for pre-crisis period (2002 to 
2007). Dconstraint is the constraint dummy that equals 1 if a firm is identified as constrained and 0 if identified as unconstrained by the respective criterion. 
Governance is defined according to Institutional Ownership (DOwner), Executive Compensation (DComp) and Eindex. DOwner and DComp are governance 
dummies that equal 1 if a firm is identified as good corporate governance and 0 if identified as poor governance based on whether the firm was in the top or 
bottom three deciles of institutional ownership or top five executive compensation (details are provided in Section 3.2). E-Index is the entrenchment index based 
on Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2006). Statistical significance is computed using standard errors robust to clustering by firm and year. Coefficient estimates are 
reported with are reported in parentheses for the OLS regressions. Coefficient estimates are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. *corresponds to significant at 
10%;** significant at 5%; and ***significant at 1%.  
 
  Panel A: Without  CG  Variables Panel B: Institutional Ownership Panel C: Equity Compensation Panel D: E-Index 
  HP 
Index 
WW 
Index 
Voting 
Method 
HP 
Index 
WW 
Index 
Voting 
Method 
HP 
Index 
WW 
Index 
Voting 
Method 
HP 
Index 
WW 
Index 
Voting 
Method 
Intercept α 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 
  (2.72)*** (2.76)*** (1.60) (3.68)*** (4.01)*** (3.43)*** (2.90)*** (4.33)*** (-0.46) (0.52) (1.33) (0.16) 
∆Ct β1 0.62 0.68 0.71 0.44 0.63 0.81 0.94 0.68 0.31 0.59 0.45 0.44 
  (2.68)*** (4.21)*** (5.75)*** (2.03)** (3.03)*** (4.34)*** (2.65)*** (3.44)*** (1.03) (3.26)*** (5.04)*** (1.93)* 
∆Ct*Dcrisis     β 2 1.06 1.15 0.26 1.67 1.40 0.22 1.15 1.27 1.30 0.72 0.55 0.09 
  (1.66)* (2.24)** (1.03) (1.74)* (2.09)** (0.69) (1.38) (2.04)** (1.71)* (2.08)** (2.43)** (0.22) 
∆Ct*Dcons β 3 0.75 0.46 0.64 1.14 0.73 0.77 2.74 2.57 2.07 -0.27 0.00 0.22 
  (2.35)** (2.32)** (3.92)*** (3.50)*** (2.61)*** (3.61)*** (2.27)** (4.64)*** (2.89)*** (-1.33) (0.01) (0.63) 
∆Ct*Dcrisis*Dcons β 4 -1.90 -2.04 -1.06 -2.90 -2.67 -1.63 -2.54 -2.89 -2.96 2.14 0.91 1.27 
  (-2.20)** (-2.49)** (-4.38)*** (-2.38)** (-2.52)** (-4.68)*** (-1.64) (-4.46)*** (-3.84)*** (4.53)*** (1.72)* (2.89)*** 
Dcrisis*Dcons β 5 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.16 -0.01 0.10 0.06 0.00 
  (-0.55) (-0.32) (-0.29) (-0.12) (-0.07) (-0.46) (-0.73) (-1.14) (-0.09) (0.96) (0.41) (0.00) 
Dcons β 6 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.17 0.12 0.04 0.00 -0.08 -0.02 
  (1.22) (0.36) (0.84) (1.04) (0.35) (0.45) (3.16)*** (1.02) (0.98) (0.01) (-0.60) (-1.04) 
Dcrisis β 7 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.00 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.00 
  (1.26) (1.25) (0.69) (0.83) (-0.08) (0.92) (2.00)** (2.12)** (1.62) (1.08) (1.45) (0.02) 
Governance β 8    -0.06 -0.08 -0.11 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 
     (-2.89)*** (-3.47)*** (-4.07)*** (-0.55) (-1.41) (0.58) (1.16) (0.34) (0.13) 
Obs  5,228 5,750 4,203 3,143 3,486 2,614 1,804 1,736 1,079 2,594 2,469 1,418 
Adj R
2  0.067 0.066 0.054 0.076 0.071 0.068 0.207 0.171 0.087 0.075 0.050 0.056 
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Highlights 
 
 It examines the value of cash holdings in the time of financial crisis. 
 It studies cash holdings with financial constraint and corporate governance. 
 It shows the value of cash holdings increases in the time of financial crisis. 
 It shows that the constraint effect on cash holdings weakens during the crisis. 
 It shows that the governance effect on cash holdings increases during the crisis. 
